She also taught her foster mommy a thing or two about the tremendous potential locked inside our canine friends.

Our girl Zoey is on the right ( a funny looking labrador, we know <VBG!>). She is with her new Mom Carol and Govener Bush of Florida who stopped by to say hello at a Fraternal Order of Police convention that Zoey's new Dad attends. She is being shown the ropes by her new friend Buddy, who has been a loyal service dog for many years and is ready to retire to the couch. Good girl Zoey, we knew you would make it!

Below is the story of Carol's fight for the right to bring her service dog to work. Carol is completely deaf and the postal service refused her the right to bring Buddy, thereby eliminating her ability to work.

<pm is Postmaster, the suit is against the United States Postal Service

> IN THE US COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE 11TH CIRCUIT COURT

> FILED MAY 28, 2002 THOMAS K. KAHN, CLERK

> Carol a. Christopherson, p vs. John E. Potter, pm, defendant

> NO. 01-14478

> D.C. DOCKET NO. 99-00490-CV-J-25TJC-3

> DUBINA, BARKETT AND KRAVITCH, CIRCUIT JUDGES

> BARKETT, Circuit Judge:

> Carol Christopherson, a hearing-impaired employee of the USPS appeals the district courts denial of her motion for judgment as a matter of law and the subsequent entry of final judgment in favor of the USPS pm on her claims that the USPS violated the rehab act, 29, osc, 794, by failing to provide reasonable accommodations for her disability. specifically Christopherson alleged that the USPS discriminated against them on the basis of her hearing related disability by denying her request to bring her service dog to work, an accommodation that would have enabled her to perform the essential functions of her job. At the close of the presentation of the evidence to the jury, the district court denied both parties motions for judgment as a matter of law and submitted the matter to the jury. upon receiving the jury's first verdict, the district court determined that the verdict was inconsistent and therefore immediately resubmitted the matter to the jury for further consideration pursuant to federal rule of civil procedure 49. neither party asked to see the first verdict or objected to the resubmission of the case to the jury. subsequent to the jury issuing its second verdict, the district court concluded that the first verdict had not been inconsistent, and thus found that there had been no basis upon which to resubmit the matter to the jury after the first verdict. Accordingly the district court entered judgment for the USPS based upon the jury's first verdict form.

> Christopherson first argues on appeal that the district court erred in denying her motion for judgment as a matter of law on the grounds that the USPS presented insufficient evidence to support to her claims of failure to accommodate. in the alternative, Christopherson contends that the district court erred in reconciling the first verdict and entering judgment in favor of the USPS because the first verdict was, as the district court initially proclaimed, inconsistent as a matter of law. moreover, Christopherson contends that the USPS waived any objection to the resubmission of the matter to the jury and this should be bound by the jury's ultimate verdict.

> We review de novo a district courts denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law, considering the evidence and the reasonable inferences there from in the light of the most favorable to the nonmoving party. see Middlebrooks v. Hillcrest foods, inc. 256 f.3d 1241, 1246 (11th circuit 2001). judgment as a matter of law "is appropriate only if the evidence is so overwhelmingly in favor of the moving party that a reasonable jury could not arrive at a contrary verdict." Id. Based on the record, we conclude that the USPS proffered insufficient evidence to support a defense to Christohperson's claim of disability discrimination, and find that a reasonable jury could not conclude that the USPS fulfilled its obligation to provide a reasonable accommodation under the rehab act. Accordingly, we find that the district court erred in denying Christohperson's motion for judgment as a matter of law.

> There is no dispute that Christopherson is a "qualified individual" who was denied her request to bring her service dog to work, an accommodation that would have allowed her to perform the essential functions of her job. Christopherson thus identified a "reasonable accommodation", thereby shifting the burden of proof to the USPS to demonstrate that Christohperson's request constituted either an undue hardship or a direct threat. We find that the USPS failed to present any competent evidence to support either an undue hardship or a direct threat defense. First, while an undue hardship defense is supported by evidence that an accommodation would be a financial or administrative burden, see Ornishea v Hopper, 171 F.3d 1289, 1303 (11th cir. 1999), the USPS presented no evidence regarding the cost of accommodating Christohperson's request for a service animal. Second, in mounting a direct threat defense, the USPS presented only generalized and lay evidence concerning the danger that any dog may pose to letter carriers. As the district court noted, the only evidence presented as to the USPS 's safety concerns was that "an extraordinary number of their mail carriers are bitten by dogs and that dogs don't like mail carriers." The court also stated that there was no evidence that the risk of dog bites was heightened by the presence of the service animal or that a carrier is a greater risk on a mail route with a dog that she would be without a dog. Because the "direct threat" determination "may not be based on generalizations or stereotypes about the effects of a particular disability...[but rather] must be based upon an individualized assessment...[and] reasonable judgment that relies on current medical evidence or on the best available objective evidence," 28CFR pt 35, App. A, 35.104, the USPS 's lay and generalized evidence cannot support a direct threat defense. Given the lack of defensive evidence, the only verdict supported by the evidence is a verdict that the USPS violated the rehab act by failing to provide a reasonable accommodation that constituted neither an undue hardship nor a direct threat.

> Our review of the record, the case law, and the district court's own statements concerning the quality of the USPS' evidence, compels our conclusion that the district court erred in denying Christohperson's motion for judgment as a matter of law. We do not reach Christohperson's alternative arguments because our disposition of this issue renders those arguments moot. Accordingly, we REVERS and REMAND with instructions to the district court to enter judgment for Christopherson in the amount rendered by the jury.

> its my typing so its complete with typos haha..and I didn't type the footnotes sorry haha...

enjoy it as we don't get many victories, and keep in mind they may appeal it to the supreme court?? you never know...

> carol and buddy